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выступал на уроке политэкономии и сказал, что у нас нет своей техники,
мы только используем буржуазную технику. Группа из трех комсомоль-
цев протаскивали антисоветскую теорию об устойчивости лично-кресть-
янского хозяйства, а один из них – занимался анекдотами против Ста-
лина» [ГАСИ ЧР. Ф. 1114. Оп 1. Д. 3. Л. 135–36].
Таким образом, молодежное сознание, вступая в борьбу с идеологи-
ческим натиском большевиков формировал устойчивый шаблон воспри-
ятия у большинства молодых людей. Не называя это покорностью, а фор-
мой адаптации к социально-политическому климату в стране, стоит от-
метить, что это сознание формировало и протестные формы, а также
формы многогранной трансформации как исторического, так и куль-
турного плана.
Государственный архив современной истории Чувашской Республики. (ГАСИ
ЧР). Ф. 6 (Обком комсомола Чувашской АССР); Ф. 1110 (Чувашский государ-
ственный педагогический институт); Фонд 1114 (Чувашская сельскохозяйствен-
ная академия).
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CRIME, PUSSIAN REVOLUTION
AND THE ORIGINAL OF THE SOVIET REGIME
Â ñîâðåìåííîé çàïàäíîé èíòåðïðåòàöèè ðåâîëþöèÿ îáû÷íî îçíà÷àåò ïå-
ðåõîä îò îäíîãî ñîöèàëüíî-ýêîíîìè÷åñêîãî è ïîëèòè÷åñêîãî ïîðÿäêà ê äðóãî-
ìó. Îäíàêî â íåêîòîðûõ ñëó÷àÿõ ðåâîëþöèÿ âåäåò ê îáùåé ñîöèàëüíîé äåãðà-
äàöèè è ðîñòó ïðåñòóïíîñòè. Èìåííî ýòî èìåëî ìåñòî â ãîäû Ðóññêîé ðåâî-
ëþöèè(èé) è Ãðàæäàíñêîé âîéíû (1917–1918). Óñèëåíèå áîëüøåâèñòñêîãî
òåððîðà è ïîñëåäóþùåå òîòàëèòàðíîå îêîñòåíåíèå îáùåñòâà áûëî, ïî êðàéíåé
ìåðå îò÷àñòè, ñëåäñòâèåì ýòîé äåãðàäàöèè.
Ê ë þ ÷ å â û å  ñ ë î â à:  Ðóññêàÿ ðåâîëþöèÿ, ñîâåòñêèé ðåæèì, ñîâåò-
ñêîå îáùåñòâî, Êðàñíûé òåððîð, ïðåñòóïíîñòü.
The word “revolution” literally means “rotation”, and in the premodern
past it indeed was nothing but the change from one dynasty to another.
“Revolution” had acquired its present-day meaning only after the French
Revolution. At that time, “revolution” became a change in social or political
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systems. The word “revolution” also acquired a rather positive meaning in most
of the writings about revolution. Therefore, those who define the Bolshevik
takeover as “revolution” usually look at it positively. Those who talk about
the “Bolshevik coup” see the events in mostly a negative light. The vision
of revolution is also implied, at least in most Western narratives, a liberation
from oppression. Consequently, those who deal with revolutions always call
the events in France from 1789 to 1794 as the “French Revolution”. Still,
practically no one among Western scholars called what happened in Germany
in 1933 the “Nazi Revolution”, albeit from a formal point of view it was indeed
a modern revolution, which entailed the transition from one political and social
order to another. Still, the “revolution”, as the events could not always been
seen as a socio-political change, and the old definition of “revolution” as just
a change of dynasty could be more appropriate. In this model of revolution,
there was not much change of the social-political composition, but it marked
a general meltdown, with a rise in crime. The “revolutionary” regime, in such cases,
engaged not just in the change of social-political order but became the force
which restored the basic order: “revolutionary” and “counter-revolutionary”
actions became the two sides of one process. And Hobbes’ explanatory model
became as important as Marxism, the philosophy of the Enlightenment, etc.
While elements of social breakdown could be seen in any revolution, it became
especially strong in premodern/“postmodern” societies. Russia could be here
a good example.
The revolution(s) of 1917 were marked by strong pulls for anarchy, social
decomposition and a rise in crime. There were several reasons for the rise
in crime. First, it was due to the general mentality of Russian peasants, the majority
of Russian society; secondly, it was due to the collapse of the monarchy,
the forces of not just external restraint, but the anchor of the Ten Commandments.
Thirdly, it was the hardships of WWI, and the revolution which pushed many
Russians to follow the criminal road just to survive.
The West and criminal mentality
Those who study Russian popular lore could easily find the glorification
of crime and criminals. These glorifications of the criminal and romanticized
image of criminal life was certainly not specific to Russian history. It had been
a part of Western European tradition for quite some time. It was common
to European traditions throughout the Middle Ages and was resurrected
somewhat in the mind of the Western European intellectuals during the Roman-
tic period. Still, by the modern era, the praise of the criminal element had
ceased to be popular among European society, and Western society in general.
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It is true that the image of successful bandits as peculiar revolutionaries/
avengers of the populace’s misery, or plainly as daredevils who succeeded
against all odds, continued to be popular in the West. This image continued
to fascinate Western historians, writers and movie producers. Still, these images
have nothing to do with reality and the general attitude of the average citizen
of modern Western society. They are the mirror image of reality. They show
not what really exists, but its opposite. They could well be compared to erotica,
or often openly pornographic images, which are common in American
culture. Still, they informed not much about real life, but what is actually opposite
to it. Real, not imaginary, American life is quite restrictive, and even prudish
in anything related to actual sexuality. The same could be said about the image
of criminals/bandits. It is mostly a mirror image of the mentality and behavior
of the average Caucasian Westerner. The abhorrence of criminal behavior was
caused by the socio-economic realities of modern capitalism.
Indeed, the development of capitalism had finally shored up the concept
of private property as the sacred backbone of society. The embracement
of private property fit in well with the acknowledgement of human rights and
political liberties, and the universalization of the Ten Commandments. Certain
acts – e. g. taking someone’s property for private benefit – became negative,
regardless of the relationship between the persons – and some of the basic
elements of social interaction became axiomatic for people, regardless of their
political beliefs. These ideas in their various degrees were not only espoused
by the elite, but deeply internalized by the majority of populations. This was
precisely what Russia was lacking and was the primary reason why the criminals
were regarded by the populace as the existential model, indeed an example
to be followed.
Russian peasants and Westerners:
different mentalities and behavioristic models
Russian peasants with their particular mentality constituted the bulk
of Russian society. This mental mindset was shaped by the Russian historical
tradition. It would be wrong to regard peasants as “immoral” in comparison
to “moral” Westerners. Moreover, many Russian peasants, as well as other
people of “premodern”/“postmodern” society would regard Westerners, and
actually people from the Russian cities, already living according to the capitalist
model by the late 19th century, as “immoral”. A peasant would note, for example,
that Westerners could be polite, smiling and sharing food and drink with peasants.
Still, this would not prevent them from taking advantage of the peasants.
He would also note that what he, the peasant, regarded as sacred ties
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of friendship, community and blood relationship, play little or no role
for Westerners. In short, Westerners were sly, deceptive and implicitly morally
“rotten” – the idea well-developed by XIXth-century Slavophiles and, of course,
not only them. For Westerners, however, Russians had no respect for formal
contractual obligations. This difference in perspective was due to the fact
that Russian peasants, even in the beginning of the 20th century, still lived
in patriarchal/premodern conditions. Most of them, even after Stolypin reforms,
were not landowners, and mostly regarded the formalities of law as being
imposed on them by officials; the people with power who demanded not just
following these legal abstractions, but also taxes and military service. Neither
law nor these obligations were actually internalized by peasants. It would
be wrong, however, to assert that Russian peasants saw in crime, and actually
society, without strong authority as quite a positive phenomenon. Actually,
the love for license had co-existed in the peasant mind with absolutely
different feelings: fear of lawlessness and anarchy. Thus, he both craved
criminal license as an opportunity to enjoy life – e. g. property, women,
liberation from any social obligations – and, at the same time, loath to experience
it for he could not be just a successful criminal, but also the victim of crime.
Still, this fear of crime and anarchy emerged only at the end of the process,
whereas in the beginning of upheaval, he usually believed that he could well
benefit from it. Thus, in the beginning of the revolution, peasants and soldiers,
“peasants in uniform”, regarded criminal license as mostly an opportunity.
And peasants’ anti-legalistic/criminal mind manifested itself and was clearly
related to little sense of private property and, therefore, legalistic web which
made private property possible.
Russian conditions and criminal behavior
Russian peasants had not developed strong feelings for private property,
plainly because they were not the proprietors of their major commodity – land.
Indeed, peasant communes, with their periodical land redistributions, continued
to exist until the very end of the tsarist regime. And this was one of the major
reasons why law and, in a way, the Ten Commandments in their universal
application, did not hold much ground in peasant society. This led to basic
rejection of the idea of private property or at least in its Western application.
One should point out that this disregard for private property was not an
exclusively Russian phenomenon. It was an essential element of any country
of the premodern era. Still, in the West, after the entrenchment of capitalism,
private property became a sacred cow. This was not the case with Russia.
It would be wrong to state that the disrespect for private property and related
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disregard for formalities of the law were always seen negatively. Indeed,
it was often seen as a blessing for quite a few Russian intellectuals, from
the Slavophiles to the Populists, who saw in that attitude a source of Christian
self-negation and socialist propensities, as well as the general broadness
of the Russian soul with its abhorrence of material goods. There were some
good points in this vision of the Russian national psyche; one should remember
here that the peasant characteristic/mentality had a lasting impact on some
segments of the elite and especially Russian intelligentsia, which had also
despised property, accumulation of wealth, and legal formalities in general.
These qualities were often admired by Westerners.
Still, there were a number of negative repercussions of this disregard
for private property. With this rationale, the restraints prohibiting the peasants
from taking property belonging to others, those who were not a part of their
household or peasant commune, were viewed as artificial by their very nature.
The restraints were not internalized but rather rejected by the peasantry, and
it was often only the power of the state which prevented them from engaging
in criminal behavior. Indeed, the police were to prevent them from taking
the belongings of others. The peasants’ desires to appropriate these effects
did not always translate into a desire to “socialize” the goods, i. e., to bring
the property to the commune and live in the commune. The drive for appro-
priating property actually often had nothing to do with an attempt to change
one social system into another, but simply to eliminate what peasants regarded
as artificial social constraints. There was also a glorification of the criminal
way of life. The successful bandit became viewed as the new popular hero and
life in a criminal gang as the happy life in an almost deal society. The successful
bandit was also seen as revolutionary, for he liberated the masses from their
repression, in this case from the restraints of the larger society. The revolution
and the final liberation could now be viewed as the triumph of criminality.
While this view did not completely dominate the popular psyche, it was
an important part of it and coincided with other images. Given these convictions,
it was not surprising that the Russian populace cherished the image of Sten’ka
Rasin, who from some perspectives was nothing but a triumphant bandit.
As a matter of fact, his image as the leader of the peasant rebellion was not
separated from the reputation of his successful looting expeditions.
With their predisposition to criminal behavior, which visibly increased
with the end of serfdom in 1861, the czarist regime was a powerful check
on peasants’ criminal behavior. The role of the Tsar was manifold. He was
the leader of the state and its repressive machinery. Still, he was more than that.
As I noted, peasants, as other people of premodern/postmodern societies, usually
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compartmentalized the Ten Commandments. They regarded as their sacred
duty to help members of the same peasant commune and were ready to sacrifice
their very lives for kin or friend. At the same time, they could well ignore
or prey on those whom they regarded as outsiders. Still, this model, as any
model, could not address the complexity of societal relationships. The sense
of universality of the Ten Commandments in the peasant mind was weak,
or at least fragile. Still, the notion existed, due to the presence of church
and the “little father” – the Tsar, to whom all members of Russian society were
“children”. All of them constituted a peculiar “family”, which entailed a sort
of mutual obligation for all “family” members. The Tsar was the very fulcrum
of Russian society; at least this was the case for peasants. Consequently,
the collapse of the monarchy was for them not just the collapse of a certain
political order, but order in itself.
The end of monarchy and collapse of order
It would be an oversimplification to see the collapse of authority as
the simple shifting of ideological paradigms from that of the monarchism
to liberal capitalism and then to radical socialism. Indeed, for many people,
World War I and the revolution, signaling the end of the sacred institution
of the monarchy, implied, to use one of Dostoevsky’s expressions, that “there
is no god; therefore everything is permissible”. In 1917, even some liberals,
who believed that Russia should follow the road of the West much more so
than others in Russian society, understood that at the beginning of the century,
Russia could not be held together simply by the rule of law, as was the case
in the West.
Paul Miliukov, the leading liberal politician, was one man with such a view.
He was aware that Russia was not a legally bound Gesellschaft society, but
rather a Gemeinschaft society: a society based on unwritten, yet internalized
laws. In the sacredness of the monarchy, it was believed that the “little father”
kept the country together. Miliukov undoubtedly understood that the power
of the monarch as a cementing force of Russian society was being reduced both
by the continuing process of Westernization, as well as by political upheavals.
The Tsar, a God-anointed charismatic leader, was still a part of the Russian
statehood and the end of the czardom would be disaster. It would not transform
Russia into a democratic republic, but would unleash anarchy on the land.
This was the reason why Miliukov urged Mikhail, Nicholas’ brother, to take
the crown. According to contemporary accounts, Miliukov’s address to Mikhail,
while not cohesive in speech, was very passionate in voice: “If you refuse ...
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your highness ... it would be disaster. Because Russia ... Russia is losing ... her
backbone ... The monarchy ... this is the backbone ... the only backbone of the
country ... the Russian masses, around what ... around what would they assemble
themselves? If you reject this ... it could be anarchy ... chaos... a bloody mess ...
Monarchy – this is the nucleus ... the only substance which everyone knows ...
This is the only commonality to Russian citizens ... the only meaning of power
... in Russia ... until now” [Shul’gin, p. 538]. The feeling imparted here
is certainly that the end of the monarchy was nothing less than the end of the
entire value system and the state itself [Svetlanin, p. 59]. It was not just the end
of tsardom as the framework for societal existence, but the collapse of its major
institutions and economic fabric. First, the army collapsed.
Army and spread of crime
The beginning of WWI had originally led to a great upsurge in patriotism
and the desire to fight for country and tsar – the country’s very symbol. And
here Russia was not very different from other countries engaged in the war.
This great enthusiasm, however, subsided as the horrors of war increased,
and here again Russia was not very different from other countries engaged
in the war. Still the army basically held its ground through 1914–1917, despite
several serious defeats. General Brusilov’s successful offensive indicated this.
Still, the February/March Revolution apparently led to a dramatic change.
The present-day Russian historiography, at least as it manifested itself in
the works of Russian journalists, blame the Bolsheviks for the problems. They
were agents of foreign influence (agenty vlianiia), fifth columnists, people
foreign to Russia and obsessed with their artificial theories on how to change
Russia and the world. They stabbed Russia in the back and snatched victory
which had been near.
This theory looks quite similar to those which circulated in German society
after the country’s defeat in WWI. Still, a close look at events indicates that
the Bolsheviks’ role was rather marginal. The end of tsardom, the system
which had held society together, at least as it was seen by soldiers, “peasants
in uniform,” was the major problem. In addition, the hardships of the war,
abolition of capital punishment as well as “Order 1”, which introduced “election”
of officers, also played a role in the disintegration of the army. Retreating
troops became marauding hordes which engaged in all types of outrages.
Desertion became a mass phenomenon and armed deserters often became
bandits. The disintegration of the army was not the only reason for the rise
in crime, especially violent crime. There were also the economic problems.
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Economic problems and crime
The general disintegration of the country’s economy threw millions of workers
into the streets. Some of them went to the countryside, while others could find
nothing to do. They were very bitter and lost belief in any political creed. They
shed their political affiliations to any institutions. There were also quite a few
who interpreted the socialist slogans of Bolshevik leaders as a license to steal.
They took the idea of the distribution of the national wealth literally – by their
own hands. Their views on life might be represented by the attitudes of some
of the workers of post-Soviet Russia who found that they were actually deceived
by the post-Communist leaders. In fact, while they blamed all workers’ problems
on the party bureaucracy, the victory of the party’s opponent brought them
even worse misery and many of them feared losing their jobs. In their anger,
they sought to participate in the robbery of the emerging post-Soviet nouveau
riche. One of them made his point clear enough to a correspondent of the new-
spaper: “This means that we are working for the fellows from the business.
If the mine will be closed, we will go to rob garages and apartments. If the life
of the people will not be again normal, this is quite possible” [Komsomol’skaia
Pravda].
In the condition of general lawlessness, especially strong in the beginning
of the Revolution and Civil War, the criminal and semi-criminal way of life
became appealing, not just for a considerable segment of the hoi polloi, but
even for members of the tsarist elite and intelligentsia, at least those who were
able to survive.
Predominance of criminal ethos
The general chaos and sense of all permissiveness had strongly affected
all segments of the population. Still, it was the masses, especially the peasants
and deserting soldiers, who became especially affected by the new conditions.
As was already noted, the criminal behavior was integrated in the peasant
mind together with the opposite drive – the fear of anarchy, and the desire
for strong power. For many peasants and soldiers, criminals indeed emerged
as the manifestation of a role model. In the eyes of quite a few of the repre-
sentatives of the Russian populace, the revolutionaries were glamorized just
because they were successful bandits. A. Vetlugin, the talented йmigrй writer
and a witness and participant in the Civil War, asserted that the very reason
why the populace had not followed the liberals and anti-Bolsheviks was because
these intellectuals did not conform to the peasants’ propensity for stealing,
and as such did not live up to their image of success. Indeed, the liberal
intellectuals of pre-revolutionary Russia were often students. “The science
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of the student, teacher was wrong, boring science. He taught that it was
prohibited to steal – ‘these are not yours!’ He knew everything, but his boots
were worn out and he had patches covering holes in the seat of his pants”
[Vetlugin, p. 389]. In contrast to the poor student, the revolutionary sailor,
the representative of the new authorities, enjoyed greater popularity among
the peasants. The reason was simple. The sailor was the perfect image of the suc-
cessful bandit and his story promised to the masses the perfect, happy criminal
life. This was indeed what many of them considered the revolution to be all
about: “The sailor was well made and ruddy, he had a diamond ring, a gold
cigarette case, lacquered boots, he measured kerenky by arshins and instead
of eating flower seeds he smoked ‘Gala Peters.’ He started his life by killing
the priest and legitimizing promiscuity. This was indeed a real lesson!” [Ibid].
While in this appraisal of the sailor, one could argue that for all of the love
the populace had for the “sailor” as a successful bandit, they also respected
him as some crude representative of the new social justice. Indeed, the same
could be said about the popular images of such personalities as Stepan Rasin.
This was undoubtedly true in many cases. Yet there is evidence that the populace
had an affinity for criminals just because they were successful. They loved
the sailors and at the same time were attached to the image of the revolution
as a social phenomenon which would liberate the populace from any social
obligations of any kind. The prospect of liberation was the most important
for the peasants and was often in no way connected, even in the most vague
way, with the actual revolutionary forces. Interestingly, the populace had
an attachment not only to the revolutionary sailor, the pure symbol of Soviet
power, but equally so to the speculator, the “bag man” who was strongly
at odds with the same Soviet power. Elaborating on the image of the speculators
in the mind of the populace, Vetlugin wrote the following: “The railroad became
the center of attention. The people who move along it were similar to the careless
birds of the sky. They were not afraid of the famine, they drank and ate as much
as they wanted, had beautiful women for making love, played cards and had
one job – to ride the railroad. The ‘speculator’ (‘piskuliant’ – corrupted in popular
parlance the word ‘spekuliant’) became the beloved hero of the Russian people
…” [Ibid., p. 388].
The criminalization of the value system affected not only the populace,
but the represntatives of the upper classes as well. Many of them had joined
the masses in their lifestyle and mentality because of the hardships of the revo-
lution and war. While some of the upper class members were able to preserve
their old values, although living the life of the masses, this was not always
the case. Many became absorbed by the popular psyche and started to share
D. Shlapentokh. Crime, Russian Revolution and the Origins of the Soviet Regime
548
the views of the masses, complete with their visions of the successful criminal
as hero. The criminalization of their minds, so to speak, moved some of them
closer to the Soviet system, for the members of the system were regarded first
of all as successful criminals. This was especially the case for the youngsters
of the upper classes. Vetlugin provided the following portrait of one such
youngster, his relative, a hawker in one of Moscow’s flea markets: “Despite
the absence of adequate merchandise, the toughness of character and the assort-
ment of obscenities, put my Moscow nephew in the forefront of the salespeople
of Trubnyi market … The young salesgirls (the ex-students of the Smol’nyi
institutes, the schools for the upper class women in imperial Russia) keep their
eyes on him and demonstrate to him the nature and the art of love making
absolutely free of charge. With the local member of Cheka he enjoys the most
friendly relationship and often visits Lubianka (Secret Police headquarters
in Moscow) to drink tea and eat the white bread brought by the relatives
of those who were executed. A long time ago he broke away from the bourgeoisie
morality and could steal with extraordinary skill a loaf of bread or chunk
of lard from the absent-minded peasant. He was not yet engaged in murder,
he only watched with adoration the deeds of certain Sen’ka, the guardsmen
who robbed the bogoradskoe treasury. He did not attend school. The hours
of the school day conflicted with the busiest market time” [Ibid., p. 12].
It was not just children from the upper and middle class who became
enticed to be part of the underworld. This was also the case with adults. In
the new society of social and moral uncoupling, it became plausible for a person
“from a good family”, a person with a respectable middle-class background,
to be the leader of a gang of criminals. [Novyi Vechernii Chas]
The spread of crime, especially in the beginning of the revolution and Civil
War, was structurally similar to what would happen in the country in the future.
Indeed, to some degree this situation also manifested itself in Soviet Russia
under Gorbachev, when the rapid changes in the political values led to
an existential vacuum of sorts, and this vacuum coupled with the weakening
of the state led to a rise in crime since the beginning of Gorbachev’s reforms
[Sovetskaia Kul’tura].
Response
The spread of criminality and similar behavior does not necessarily lead
to the powerful response from the state. Disorder could lead to a variety of solu-
tions. One of them was the institutionalization of banditry, and the emergence
of hierarchical structures of criminals who, in the process, would create
an alternative social order. This was, for example, the case in the Middle Ages,
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which followed a centuries-long period of chaos and criminality. The hierar-
chical feudal order, based on protection and patronage in exchange for goods
and services, looks surprisingly similar to what emerged in the late Yeltsin/
early Putin Russia as an elaborate and hierarchical structure of “roofs” (krysha).
In the case of the early Bolshevik regime, the model was different. It is
true that the repressive machinery of the state could sometimes collaborate
with criminals and/or incorporate them into their midst. Still, the preferred
model was different. Criminals, especially violent criminals, were, in most cases,
mercilessly exterminated by the Red Terror; their fate, of course, was not
different from that of the real or imaginary political enemies of the regime
or those social groups which the regime also regarded as dangerous. Therefore,
one could assume that crime and social decomposition in years of revolution
and civil war played an important role in upholding the country’s political culture
when strong power is the only guarantee of basic order.
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Ñ. À. Øìåëåâ
ÁÛÒ ÊÎÌÌÓÍÈÑÒÎÂ ÝÏÎÕÈ ÍÝÏ
È ÂÎÏÐÎÑÛ ÏÀÐÒÈÉÍÎÉ ÝÒÈÊÈ
Ñòàòüÿ ïîñâÿùåíà ïðîáëåìå ôîðìèðîâàíèÿ íîâîãî áûòà êîììóíèñòîâ â ïå-
ðèîä ðåàëèçàöèè íîâîé ýêîíîìè÷åñêîé ïîëèòèêè è âîïðîñàì ïàðòèéíîé ýòèêè,
ñòàâøèõ àêòóàëüíûìè â ñâÿçè óñèëåíèåì ìåëêîáóðæóàçíûõ èíòåðåñîâ è óãðî-
çîé ðàçëîæåíèÿ ïàðòèè.
Ê ë þ ÷ å â û å  ñ ë î â à:  íîâûé áûò, ïàðòèéíàÿ ýòèêà, «áîëåçíè» ïàðòèè,
ïàðòèéíûå êîíòðîëüíûå êîìèññèè.
 С началом строительства социализма в СССР в 1920-е гг. повсе-
дневная бытовая жизнь людей, в прежние времена складывавшаяся сти-
хийно и находившаяся во власти обычаев и традиций, попала в сферу
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